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Case No. 7605 
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·of the 
- ----·--·- ----·- -- - - · --~ ·· · · ~ - .~ - .:• l 
BUDGET HOMES, INC., a corpora- -· ~(~i;.;1<-.-&~.preme Co\.tr t , Utan 
tion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMIS.SION, 
Defendant. 
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IN ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S. PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
C. M. GILMOUR, 
DON J. HANSON, 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
o.f the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUDGET HO~iES, INC., a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX CO:\I~IIS.SION, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
7605 
DEFENDANT'S. REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF· 
IN ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S. PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT 
This reply is filed pursuant to order of the Chief 
Justice dated October 23, 1951. The Tax Commission 
appreciates the opportunity of filing this reply in view 
of the serious and important issue presented by this case. 
The Commission is, of course, fully aware of the 
difficulties involved in persuading the Court to rehear 
a case. Ordinarily when a case is tried, appealed, briefed, 
argued and decided, all aspects of the case have been 
thoroughly explored by the c·ourt. In such circumstances 
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a petition for rehearing travels a vvorn path. The fact, 
however, that the rules do provide for a rehearing pro-
cedure is at least an indication that on some occasions, 
however rare they may be, a miscarriage of justice may 
occur. This case is such an occasion. 
To justify the rehearing of a case, counsel should 
be able to point to some decisive law applicable to the 
issue of the case which was overlooked by the Court 
and which, if considered, would lead the court to a 
different result. This case is such an instance. 
We make no reply herein to Plaintiff's charge of 
inconsistency other than to state that far above any 
duty on the part of Counsel to be consistent, if such 
duty there be, is the duty to bring to the Court all of 
the facts and all of the law necessary to enable the Court 
to arrive at a correct decision of the case. Consistency 
is not such a jewel as to prevent the suppression on 
rehearing of the law applicable to the case where such 
law was not previously considered by the Court. 
Nor do we think it behooves any taxpaye-r, especially 
one coming into Court so soaked and dripping with 
illegality as this one, to imply that the Tax Commission 
as judge, prosecutor and jury failed to give the taxpayer 
a fair and impartial hearing. Any remarks or sugges-
tions which c·ounsel may have for the improvement of 
administrative procedures in the State of Utah should, 
we think, be directed to the appropriate authorities in-
dependently and not as an argument in this case. 
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The Commission's petition for rehearing here rests 
on the ground that Budget Homes, Inc. "\Vas not liqui-
dated or dissolved in la."\v and therefore continued in 
business in fact. 'V e argue that the Court in its opinion 
by assuming that the assets of Budget Homes, Inc. were 
distributed to the stockholders in a genuine and bona 
fide liquidation, assumed the very point in issue in the 
case. We argue that by the wholesale violation of the 
Utah Statutes relating to the liquidation and dissolution 
of Utah corporations, the so-called liquidation of 
Budget Homes, Inc. "\Vas illegal, abortive and of no effect. 
We argue that in violating the corporation laws, the 
penal code and the public policy of the State of Utah, 
Budget Homes, Inc. and its four shareholders have by 
their illega1ity forfeited those tax benefits which are 
reserved for those who comply with our statutes. We 
argue that the Tax Commission and this Court cannot 
recognize as valid for tax purposes that which is in clear 
and admitted violation of the civil and penal code of this 
state. We argue that an illegal transaction is a sham 
transaction. 
How does Plaintiff meet this argument~ As "\Ve 
read his brief, he argues that all of the provisions in 
the Utah Statutes covering the lawful liquidation and 
distribution of the assets of a Utah corporation are mere 
formalisms, that they are designed for the protection of 
those who might be prejudiced-"stockholders, creditors, 
or even tax authorities where a tax is actually owing"-, 
that the Tax Commission has not been prejudiced and 
has no right to complain as a creditor in this case because 
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by the Court's own opinion it is now adjudged that no 
tax is owing by the corporation. 
We cannot help but express our concern at such 
an infirm, shallow and feeble argument which, in essence, 
asserts that the state has no right to complain because 
there is no tax owing and then asserts that there is no 
tax owing because the state has no right to complain. 
Not until this Court's decision has become final will it 
have been adjudged no tax is owing. The Court's present 
opinion, unless changed, will be difficult enough as a 
precedent in the future without having it cited against 
us at this stage while we are all struggling to help the 
Court determine whether or not it is correct. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATUTES RELATING TO THE LIQUIDA-
TION AND DISSOLUTION OF UTAH CORPORATIONS 
WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, AMONG 
OTHERS, AND THE COMMISSION HAS A RIGHT TO COM-
PLAIN HERE OF THEIR VIOLATION. 
Under Section 18-2-17, the capital of a corporation 
cannot be paid over to the stockholders "except as pro-
vided by law." The legal requirements for such with-
drawal are six in number, namely: 
(1) Payment of the corporation's debt and taxes 
or the making of adequate provision therefor. 
(2) Approval of the plan of liquidation and dis-
solution by a two-third vote of the stockholders. 
( 3) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing 
with the State Tax Commission and with the S.ecretary 
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of State an affidavit that all debts and taxes have been 
paid or provided for. 
( ±) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing 
with the State Tax Conunission and with the Secretary 
of State a verified copy of the resolution by the share-
holders authorizing the liquidation. 
( 5) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing 
with the State Tax Commission and with the Secreta.ry 
of State an affidavit that a copy of the liquidation reso-
lution was mailed to every non-participating shareholder. 
(6) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing 
with the State Tax Commission and with the Secretary 
of State proof that notice was published once a week for 
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper to inform the 
public it was ceasing to do business as a corporation 
and giving the dates on which distribution of assets 
would be made. 
Also, Section 103-12-4 of the Penal Code provides 
in part as follows : 
"Every director of any stock corporation who 
concurs in any vote or act of the directors of 
such corporation or any of them by which it is 
in tended either : 
(2) To divide, withdraw or in any manner, 
except as provided by law, pay to the stock-
holders, or any of them, any part of the capital 
of the corporation; * * * ; - is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." 
We have pTeyiously pointed out that Plaintiff flag-
rantly violated the above provisions. Of the six require-
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ments, only. one was met, namely, the approval of the 
stockholders to the plan of liquidation. The other five 
requirements were admittedly violated. Plaintiff's ap-
proach has been to discuss each violation separately and 
dismiss it because it is such a small thing. We are not 
here faced, however, with a case of substantial com-
pliance. We are faced with the wholesale violation of 
statutes de-signed expressly and specifically for the pro-
tection and benefit of the State Tax Commission. 
When the statute states that the capital assets can-
not be withdrawn from the corporation except where the 
necessary affidavits and proofs have been deposited 
with the State Tax Commission prior to the distribution 
of the assets, we think it is pretty obvious that this stat-
ute was designed for the protection of the State Tax 
Commission. It is not a statute designed solely for the 
protection of stockholders and creditors. Therefore, 
when Plaintiff in black-faced type asks "Just whom 
then is the Commission looking after~", the reply is 
obvious. 
What can the meaning and the legislative intent of 
these requirements be if not to permit the State Tax 
Com~ission to ignore for tax purposes those abortive 
transactions which plainly violate the clear terms of the 
statute~ Is violation of the statute to be given the same 
effect as compliance~ Does illegality merit such high 
reward~ 
Just as Plaintiff concedes that minority stockhoJders 
or creditors can make the stockholders "put it back", 
so also under this statute can the Tax Commission 
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make the stockholders "put it back" for tax purposes. 
When the statute requires notice to the State Tax Com-
mission, it is prejudiced and seriously prejudiced when 
this notice is not given. The Tax Commission has sev-
eral thousand domestic and foreign corporations on its 
corporation franchise tax rolls. How can it possibly audit 
these returns and determine tax liabilities if it cannot 
follow and rely on the status of the corporations as 
they appear on the records of the state as required by 
the statutes~ 
Plaintiff's argument that the Tax Commission has 
no right to complain because there is no tax actually 
owing begs the question. It overlooks the fact that the 
point involved here is one of status, the status of Budget 
Homes, Inc. as a corporation. It was given corporate 
status by the law and this status cannot be dissolved 
except by law. To argue that the several things which 
give and take away that status are little things-"pure 
formalism"-is unsound. 
A marriage license and indeed the marriage cere-
mony itself may be regarded, under this view, as small 
things-"pure formalism"-but they are essential. A 
divorce decree is, after all, only a piece of paper but 
it is mandatory. An adoption proceeding may be regard-
ed as a mere legal ritual, the: ap·pointment of a guardian 
as a lot of legal mumbo-jumbo, but in all these matters 
of status the law, as we understand it, is quite careful to 
surround both the creation and dissolution of the status 
with certain legal requirements and safeguards. These 
requirements are not "pure fomalism," they are essential 
to such status. Individuals acquire corporate status by 
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statute and cannot terminate such status except by stat-
ute. 
It is true in this case that Prudential, a very large 
creditor, has not complained. There was no need for it 
to complain. The abortive liquidation which took place 
here was so illegal that insofar as Prudential was con-
cerned it could be completely ignored. Under the statute, 
the debts of Budget Homes, Inc. to Prudential should 
have been paid prior to the distribution of the assets 
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets. They were 
not. The corporation continued personally liable for 
its debts to Prudential. Prudential's rights on the mort-
gaged assets continued unimpaired, its rights as creditor 
against the unmortgaged assets were in no way disturbed. 
vV e suggest that what Prudential did or did not do, 
what it may or may not have done, does not affect in 
the slightest the right of the Tax Commission to look 
after its interests. 
Plaintiff emphasizes (p. 5, 9, 10) the provision (Sec. 
18-2-17.11) which requires the suit for dissolution to be 
filed in court within 90 days from distribution except 
where "sufficient reason" appears. He argues that in-
stallation of the meter boxes and doing nece·ssary road 
work constitutes sufficient reason for the time lag in 
this case between resolution date and filing of the suit 
in court and that in any event this is a matter for the 
District c·ourt to determine, not the Tax Commission. 
It is a pleasure to agree with at least one of Plaintiff's 
arguments. Unfortunately, however, this argument is 
beside the· point. We are arguing that the Tax Commis-
sion cannot accept the legitimacy of the liquidation in 
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this case, not because of the delay between resolution 
date and filing of the dissolution suit (Sec. 18-2-17.11), 
but because under Sec. 18-2-17, another section, assets 
cannot be distributed to shareholders in advance of a 
court decree unless prior to the distribution of the assets 
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets, the neces-
sary affidavits and notices are filed with the State Tax 
Commission. 
Plaintiff makes a point (p. 9) also of the fact that 
the dissolution provisions a.re in the chapter on corpora-
tions and are not revenue 1neasures because not con-
tained in the chapter relating to taxation. This point, 
although unsound, ~erits some discussion. Actually, 
these provisions are partly in the corporation law, (Sec. 
18-2-17 et seq.), partly in the Judicial Code (Sec. 104-
42-1 et seq.) under "Voluntary Dissolution of Corpora-
tions,'' and partly in the Penal Code (Sec. 103-12-4). 
However, we concede they are not in the chapter on 
taxation. At the same time·, we do not concede that they 
have nothing to do with taxation. Obviously they do. 
The State Tax Commission is specifically mentioned 
in Sec. 18-2-17. Assets cannot there be distributed to 
shareholders unless prior to the distribution of the assets 
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets certain 
affidavits and notices are filed with the State Tax Com-
mission, including an affidavit that all known debts and 
taxes have been paid or pro~ded for. The Corporation 
Franchise Tax Section of the Auditing Division carries 
on a considerable amount of its activity under this sec-
tion of the corporation law. This section in turn is tied 
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in with the criminal provision (Sec; 103-12-4) which 
excepts those withdrawals by shareholders which are 
"pr·ovided by law." s.ection 104-42-6 of the Judicial 
Code also has a lot to do with a corporation's tax lia-
bility. It contains provisions relating to the tax certifi-
cate from the State Tax Commission before dissolution 
by the court. More importantly, however, it provides: 
"The tax liability of the corporation shall 
be determined as of the date the corporation 
formally resolved in a proper resolution to quit 
doing business as a corporation, provided, how-
ever, that if a corporation does business other 
than in the normal course of liquidation, and 
winding-up its affairs, after the date determined 
in said resolution, the tax liability of said cor-
poration shall be fixed as of the date the cor-
poration actually ceased doing business." 
It is this important provision, on final analysis, in 
relation with its companion provisions in the corpora-
tion franchise tax law, the corporation law and the penal 
code, which must be construed by this Court to decide 
this case. Plaintiff's suggestion that the above provision 
is not in the taxation chapter and, therefore, has nothing 
to do with taxation is clearly absurd. Although it. would 
be highly desirable if the legislature put all provisions 
relating to taxation in the chapter on taxation, the Tax 
Commission cannot avoid its duty to administer the 
state's tax laws wherever they may be found. 
For example, there is nothing in the Inheritance 
Tax Law authorizing the Tax Commission to release 
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inheritance tax liens. Fortunately, however, placed 
in an obscure corner of the Judicial c·ode under the 
heading "Termination of Life Estate" (Sec. 104-41-1) 
is such authority. Are the many releases issued over 
the years by the Commission invalid for this reason~ 
The Court cannot, therefore, avoid a consideration 
of the above quoted provision in the Judicial C.ode which 
determines ".,.hen and how the tax liability of a corpora-
tion in liquidation and dissolution is cut off . 
..~..t\..gain, we say it sets forth in effeet three simple 
rules: 
(1) If the corporation does not liquidate 
according to law, it continues so far as the State 
Tax Commission is concerned until it is liquidated 
according to lR\V. 
(2) If it liquidates lawfully, its tax liability 
is determined as of the resolution date, provided 
its activities thereafter are confined to winding-
up its affairs. 
(3) If it liquidates lawfully but continues 
to do business after the resolution date., its tax 
liability is determined as of the date it actually 
ceases to do business. 
(a) If the post-resolution business is pro-
duction only with no selling, tax is computed 
on either the minimum or property basis, 
whichever is higher. 
(b) If the post-resolution business is pro-
duction and selling, tax is computed on either 
the minimum, property or income basis, 
whichever is highe·r. 
We think the present case can only fit under sub-
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division (1) above. Plaintiff's Reply Brief contains a 
lot of remarks about the crown jewels of Utah, the splen-
did virtues of consistency, the fact that the Commission 
is judge, prosecutor, jury, etc., but we have so far been 
unable to penetrate· these various remarks deep enough 
to determine in which category Plaintiff thinks his case 
falls. 
Plaintiff can hardly contend it falls under (2) above 
so as to completely cut off the tax liability as of October 
31, 1947 because by its own tax returns filed for the 
years 1948 and 1949 it continued as a corporation doing 
business in Utah after that date. Furthermore, it con-
tinued by the evidence in this case to exercise its cor-
porate powers by installing meters, constructing a road 
and showing up in person at each closing transaction 
of each sale· of each house to sign the substitution agree-
ment with Prudential under which the debt owing by 
Budget Homes, Inc. was taken over hy the purchaser. 
If, by some stretch of the imagination, this post-reso-
lution activity is regarded as winding-up activity only, 
the taxes voluntarily paid with its returns for 1948 
and 1949 were collected in error. On the other hand, if 
this post-resolution activity is something more than 
winding-up activity and assuming the lawfulness of the 
liquidation, the question then would be, does the case 
fit under 3 (a) or 3 (h)~ 
In its most favorable light, Plaintiff's strongest case 
would be an attempt to fit under 3 (a). A somewhat 
plausible case could perhaps be built up. along this line. 
The difficulty of Plaintiff's position in this regard, how-
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ever, is that it con1pletely overlooks the requirement of 
the statute that to distribute the assets to the stock-
holders the corporation must file the necessary affidavits 
and notices 'vith the Tax Commission prior to the dis-
tribution of the assets repeat prior to the distribution 
of the assets, 'vhich requirement was clearly intended 
for the benefit and protection of the Tax Commission. 
However, if the Court construes this requirement as 
requiring the Commission to get the directors of Budget 
Homes, Inc. thrown into jail under Sec. 103-12-4 of the 
Penal Code to secure compliance with the provisions 
of Sec. 18-2-17, and as not authorizing the c·ommission 
to ignore the so-called liquidation when Sec. 18-2-17 has 
been clearly violated (which, of course, would destroy 
category (1) above), Plaintiff is then faced with the 
difficulty of fitting in 3 (b) rather than 3 (a) because 
of its participation in each sale of each house at each 
closing transaction. 
Plaintiff's remarks on page 7 completely gloss o¥er 
the fact that at each sale of each house at each closing 
transaction, the President of Budget Homes, Inc. showed 
up in person on behalf of Budget Homes, Inc. and joined 
in an agreement with Prudential and the purchaser, 
together with the stockhoJders. Here, acting under 
its corporate· powers and in consideration of various 
promises, waivers and representations, Prudential re-
leased the debt of Budget Homes, Inc. on that particular 
house, it being in the agreement assumed by the pur-
chaser. What more active participation by Budget 
Homes, Inc. in the sales is necessary to put it in 3 (b) 
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above~ The individual sales could not be made by the 
stockholders of Budget Homes, Inc. without the partici-
pation of Budget Homes, Inc. in the sale. The financing 
of a sale is an integral part of a sale. Budget Homes, 
Inc. in signing the substitution agreement in effect trans-
ferred its financing arrangements with Prudential to the 
purchaser. The purchaser stepped into the boots of 
Budget Homes, Inc. We ask the Court to take another 
look at the substitution agreement appearing at pages 
81-82 of the Record. Subdivision (1) above fits this case, 
but if it doesn't 3 (b) must. In either (2) or 3 (a) Budget 
Homes, Inc. would be a square peg in a round hole. 
In the Pace Case, 91 Utah 132 (1936), the Court in 
considering Sec. 103-12-4 in another connection stated 
(p.137): 
"It would seem that the implication from 
sub-division 2, 103-12-4, which 1nakes it a mis-
demeanor for a director to concur in any vote 
by which it is intended to pay to a stockholder 
any portion of the capital was that it would be 
against public policy to do the very thing which 
makes it a crime for such director to concur in." 
To decide this case in Plaintiff's favor the Court 
must hold that Sec. 18-2-17 has criminal but no civil 
sanction and that the participation of Budget Homes, 
Inc. in each sale of each house at each closing transac-
tion was a mere nothing at all. If the Court meets these 
issues and decides that Plaintiff should still prevail, 
Plaintiff will find the Commission to be a good loser. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is an important case from the standpoint 
of the need of the Commission and the corporate tax-
payers of the state for guidance in determining when 
and how state tax liabilities are to be terminated in 
liquidation and dissolution proceedings. The statute as 
we interpret it is both fair and workable from the admin-
istrative standpoint. It seen1s little enough to ask the 
men1bers of the Bar of this state to follow the statute 
and, to insure compliance, to continue assessing the 
franchise tax against the corporation until the statute 
is followed. The tax itself is small while the corporate 
privileges granted by the state are great. The Court's 
present opinion gives the Commission very little light 
on a difficult administrative problem because it doesn't 
consider the problem. The effect of the· decision is to 
condone the most flagrant violation of our statutes which 
were clearly intended to give some measure of protec-
tion to the Tax c·ommission in the discharge: of its duties. 
The case, unfortunately, seems to have been re-
garded by the Court as a tax avoidance problem. FTom 
the state's standpoint, this is not so. We attack the 
transaction simply by virtue of the wholesale and fla-
grant violation of the state statutes which set forth an 
orderly and sensible procedure for the liquidation and 
dissolution of Utah corporations. Whether or not by 
winning the case, the state would get additional tax from 
these taxpayers is very doubtful. On the face of it, we 
are caught in the position of attempting to collect a 3% 
tax from the corporation when presumably 5% tax has 
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already been paid by the stockhoJders. Whether or not 
after putting the income back, the Commission should 
permit some portion to be treated as salary withdrawal 
(deductible) or dividend withdrawal (non-deductible) 
remains to be seen. Of if the stockholders actually put 
the money back and file claims for refund of their indi-
vidual tax they may want to keep it in the corporation. 
It is impossible to say. In any event, it should be obvious 
that the case is not a tax avoidance problem so far as the 
state is concerned. 
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the case 
does involve the avoidance of Federal taxes. Federal 
income taxes are now at such high levels on both cor-
poTations and individuals that the use of collapsible cor-
porations has become quite widespread. By use of this 
device the corporation tax is avoided because the cor-
poration does not sell and the gain to the stockholders 
who do sell is not taxed as ordinary income but is treated 
as capital gain arising from liquidation of the corpora-
tion's assets. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has at-
tempted to meet this problem by suits under the Court 
Holding Company doctrine and recent legislation by 
Congress attempts also to deal with the problem. 
If Budget Homes, Inc. and its stockholders think 
they can reduce their Federal taxes legally in the Utah 
courts, that is their prerogative. Let us be sure, ho,v-
ever, that when the decision of the highest court of Utah 
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sets sail into the Federal courts to engage in the 
battle of collapsible corporations, the decision is 
seaworthy enough to stand the strain. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. GILMOUR, 
DON J. HANSON, 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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